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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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Arugment Priority Classification #16 
Gayle Dean Hunt #1585 
Steven A. Wuthrich #6055 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT & ASSOCIATES 
50 South 600 East, Suite 250 
Telephone 355-3636 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Lewis H. Mousley, et al. 
Appellees 
Mitchell J. Olsen No. #3845 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone 255-7176 
Attorneys for Appellees 
PARTIES_ON_APPEAL 
Appellant is Garrard Garage and Implement Corporation. Lewis H. 
Mousley, Ruth M. Mousley, Effie P. Mouselyf Olive E. Mousley, Fairald 
R. Mousley, Bayard W. Mousley, Owen Mousley, Arlin Mousley, Norma M. 
Webb, and Elna M. Thompson are Appellees. 
Defendants Spencer Blake, Erveena Blake, Pearl M. Nielsen and 
Wyman I. Nielsen are no longer participating in the case. They were 
Assignees of Appellant's interest in the contract, and after Blakes 
filed bankruptcy their interest was surrendered back to Garrard in 
the bankruptcy proceedings. 
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I^_ JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A. 78-2-2 and may refer case to the Court of Appeals if it so 
elects. 
II^_ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1: Where the trial Court rules that a party's counsel 
shall prepare proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
consistent with the Court's rulings and said counsel withdraws, 
should the Court set aside the Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment 
submitted by opposing counsel under Rule 60(a) when said Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment are inconsistent with the Court's rulings? 
ISSUE NO. 2: Where the Judge finds both Buyer and Seller under 
an installment real estate contract, which includes water stock, are 
in breach, and orders a partial conveyance to Buyer and partial 
foreclosure by Seller, is the Court required as a matter of law to 
apportion the water stock? 
ISSUE NO 3: Under a contract for the sale of real property, 
where Buyer pledges security for the performance of building a 
bridge, did the Court err by awarding Seller the value of the 
security as a measure of damages, but without deducting Seller's 
concurrent savings for not having to build the bridge? 
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111.^  STANDARD_OF_APPELLATE_REVIEW 
(1) With regards to the Motion to Set Aside Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment as a clerical error, Appellant maintains 
this is a question of law (although the Appellate Courts have not 
expressly so stated) See, e.g. Meac[her_v^Egui.tY_2iJL_Co^, 5 Ut 2d 
196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956); Li_nd s a ^ v ^ A t k i.n, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984); 
SL^rrin^ ton_v j„Wad e, 812 P.2d 452 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). 
(2) With respect to the apportionment of the water stock, 
Appellant believes this is a question of law. There are no cases 
construing the statute. 
(3) The issue of whether the Court properly awarded the correct 
measure of damages for the failure to build a bridge is reviewed by 
determining whether or not there is substantial, reasonable and 
credible evidence supporting the Findings. See KeJJ.e£_y^_Desej:et 
Mo£tuary_Co_;_, 23 Ut.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969). 
IV^ STATEMENT_OF_THE_CASE 
A^_Nature_of _the_Ca.se 
On February 1, 1978, Appellant Garrard Garage and Implement 
Corporation entered into a real estate contract to buy approximately 
46 acres of real property and appurtenant water stock from Appellees 
Mousley (hereinafter enumerated). Sellers were to "release" one acre 
for every $7,000 principal paid to Buyer (excluding the $50,000 down 
payment). Buyers were to make annual payments and, within one year, 
build a bridge along a specified portion of the land. 
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Appellant assigned his rights under the contract to Defendants 
Blake in the second year of the contract. No bridge was constructed 
as Appellant could not get permits from the County for the 
appropriate right-of-way. Payments were made, albeit late, through 
1984, and accepted by Appellees. 
The 1985 payment was placed in escrow, but later returned back 
to buyers assignee (Blakes) and not received by Sellers. No payments 
were received from 1985 through 1989, the date of trial. 
Sellers never executed the Special Warranty Deeds releasing the 
one acre per $7,000 principal paid for the years 1980, 1981, 1982, 
1983, and 1984 despite having received the monies. 
The Contract had a specific additional security for the building 
of the bridge, i.e. assignment of Appellant's rights under another 
contract (the Lear Contract). The Lear contract was a real estate 
contract under which Garrard was selling unrelated real property to 
the Lears, and was receiving payments. The Lear Contract was to be 
placed in escrow, and if the bridge was not built in one year, Seller 
was to get the payments and utilize the monies received to build the 
bridge. The Lear contract was never placed in escrow. 
Eventually, Garrard filed suit to obtain the releases due for 
monies paid, or rescind the contact with interest to Appellant. 
Appellees answered and counterclaimed for foreclosure against Garrard 
for failure to build the bridge and make payments after 1985. 
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B^ _ Facts_and_Course_of^_Pr;oceedi1n£S 
1. On February 1, 1978, Plaintiff Garrard Garage and Implement 
Corporation (hereinafter "Garrard") entered into a real estate 
contract to purchase approximately 46 acres of property located in 
Salt Lake County, Utah for the sum of $250,000.00 from Defendants 
Lewis H. Mousley, Ruth M. Mousley, Effie P. Mousley, Olive E. 
Mousley, Fairald R. Mousley, Bayard W. Mousley, Owen Mousley, Arlin 
Mousley, Norma Webb, and Elna M. Thompson (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Mousley".) (Exhibit 2, see also Stipulation of 
Facts, R. p. 416-417) (See also R. p. 158-164) 
2. The contract provided for conveyance by means of a "Special 
Warranty Deed." (R. 158-164, paragraph 4) 
3. The contract further provided that for each $7,000 that the 
buyer paid toward principal (excluding the $50,000 down payment) 
sellers were to "release" one acre to the buyer and that for every 
six acres released on the 34-acre tract, one acre was to be released 
on the 12-acre tract. (R. 158-164, paragraph 5) 
4. The conveyance by Special Warranty Deed was applicable to 
the "releases" as well as to the entirety when the contract was fully 
paid. (R. 158-164, paragraph 4) 
5. In addition to the bare ground, the buyer was to receive 15 
shares of Jordan Irrigation Company Water Stock and 40 shares Draper 
Irrigation Company Water Stock. (R. 158-164, paragraph 2). 
6. In addition to annual payments, the buyer was to construct a 
50-foot right-of-way alongside the 12-acre tract with a 16-foot 
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bridge across the East Jordan Canal to connect the two tracts of 
land. Buyer was to place in escrow a certain Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (hereinafter "Lear Contact") as security for the 
aforementioned right-of-way and bridge construction. The contract 
further provided that, "In the event said right-of-way and bridge are 
not constructed within one year, said Trustee shall_assi.2Q_§£i(3 
22nt£§ct_to_sellers_for_the_£U£ 
^H^-^£M2§-L (emphasis added). (R. 158-164, paragraph 7) 
7. Buyer made numerous payments totaling some $120,000 in 
principal in addition to the $50,000 down payment (R. 416-424) 
8. No "releases" were executed by Sellers or their Trustees (R. 
416-424). 
9. Buyer did not construct the right-of-way bridge within one 
year, nor was the Lear Contract assignment properly placed in escrow. 
(R. 416-424) 
10. The present action was filed on March 23, 1988, Appellant 
herein seeking to obtain the "releases" justly due under the 
contract, or any alternative rescision and money damages (R. 002-
008) . 
11. Defendants answered, asserting in part the Appellant's 
breach for failure to construct the bridge and provide the Lear 
Contract. (R. 08-21) 
12. After a 2-day Court trial ending 10-19-89, the Court, Hon. 
Scott Daniels, made rulings from the bench and therein instructed 
Appellant's counsel to prepare written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 546-553). 
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13. On December 14, 1989, prior to preparation of the Findings 
and Conclusions, Appellant's counsel terminated his relationship with 
the Plaintiff. (R. 218) 
14. While Appellant was attempting to obtain substitute 
counsel, Appellees' counsel submitted proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, which Findings and Conclusions were signed 
February 8, 1990. (R. 222-235) The unsigned certificate of mailing 
shows a copy sent to Tage Nyman, 1735 South West Temple (R. 235); 
However, Mr. Nyman testified at trial that his address was 1144 South 
300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 437). 
15. Thereafter, a Motion was filed by Neal Gunnarson to set 
aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the grounds that 
several pertinent portions of the Findings and Conclusions were 
inconsistent with the Court's rulings. (R. 270-273) 
16. For example, paragraph 9 of the Conclusions of Law purport 
to grant Defendants a Judgment against Appellant for $18,850 plus 
interest at 7 1/2% per annum from 1979 until the Judgment, plus 
interest, is paid in full. (R. 239) 
17. No Notice of signing of Judgment has been filed or received 
by Appellant. (See Docket) 
18. In December 1991, Appellant discovered title companies were 
picking up the Judgment as a Judgment Lien on all properties of 
Appellant, and filed an amended Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, pointing out the inconsistencies between the 
documents submitted by Appelles and signed by the Court and the 
Court's own rulings in the case. 
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19. The Court, in its October 19, 1989 ruling stated that: 
(a) That the contract "imposes upon the buyer that 
obligation to build a bridge and construct this right-
of-way-" (R. 547) 
(b) That "I don't think the doctrine of legal 
impossibility excuses that requirement." (R. 547) 
(c) That the exclusive remedy for the failure of buyers to 
build a bridge is that taking of assignment of the 
Lear (sic) real estate contract." (R. 548). 
(d) That the failure to build a bridge did not excuse 
Sellers from their obligation for release property. 
(R. 548) 
(e) That this is a case in equity and the Court has a 
right to fashion an equitable remedy. (R. 548-549 
(missed page)) 
(f) What needs to be done is "figure out the value of the 
Lear contract payments that were made under the Lear 
contract and those amounts should be credited to the 
Sellers since that contract should have gone to them. 
So you take how much they should have gotten under the 
Lear contract, including interest; you deduct that 
from the amount of payments which are now due, 
including interest, and the buyers can reinstate that 
contract by making that payment." (R. 548-549) 
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20, The Court then restated its ruling as follows: 
Now, I am going to require the Sellers to 
convey to the Buyers as many acres of property as 
the buyers would be entitled to if they had been 
making those conveyances all along. That_isx 
2I12£_Z2u_fi2U££_the_amou^^ 
tll§«§in2^Qt_2i-t^§«t§§£_22Qt£§2t-L-theY_are 
^Il^-i^§Z-^ilI_^§-I§2Mi£§^_t2«I!l§]i§-t^§t-.22IlY§Z§Ii2§ 
immediately;. And then if the buyers do reinstate 
the contract, by making the payments, the seller 
would be obligated to make further—at that time 
and at that closing, sellers would be obligated 
to make further conveyance of one acre per $7,000 
based upon the amount they pay at the time the 
contract is reinstated. If the contract is not 
reinstated within 90 days, then an order of 
foreclosure can enter. It can be foreclosed as 
note and mortgage, but only on the amount of real 
estate that's left after the first conveyance, 
which I'm referring to now of one acre per every 
$7,000 of principle paid. (R. 549) [emphasis 
supplied] 
21. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the 
Judgment provides as follows: 
(9) That the Mousleys be granted Judgment 
against the Plaintiff on the Lear Contract, in 
the amount of $18,850 (Eighteen Thousand Eight 
Hundred Fifty Dollars) plus interest at the rate 
of 7 1/2% (Seven and One Half Percent) from the 
1st day of February, 1979, until the Judgment 
amount plus interest is paid in full. 
(10) That in the event the Plaintiff fails 
to reinstate the agreement, the Mousleys be 
granted Judgment against the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $80,000 (Eighty Thousand Dollars) plus 
accrued interest at the rate of 8% from August 1, 
1984 through January 1, 1990, in the amount of 
$37,682.36 (Thirty Seven Thousand Six Hundred 
Eighty Two Dollars and thirty six cents) plus 
interest of 17.53% per diem until the Judgment is 
paid in full. 
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(11) That the Mousleys convey to the 
Plaintiff, by quit claim deed, a total of 17 
(seventeen) acres of the real property set forth 
in the Agreement (R. 222-247) 
22. The conveyances to Plaintiff were by quit claim deed in the 
Findings and Conclusions rather than by special warranty deed as set 
forth in the Contract and as ordered by the Court. (R. 248-253) 
23. The "valuation" of the Lear Contract in paragraph 9 was the 
gross value, at inception of the contract, which contract was entered 
into years prior to the date of assignment called for in the Garrard 
Mousley agreement, and was calculated without any deduction for 
payments received prior to the assignment date and without deduction 
for encumbrances. (R. 227) Rather than deduct the Lear Contract 
"value" from the land to be conveyed to Appellant, the Findings and 
Judgment give a money Judgment in direct opposition to the 
instructions of the Court. 
24. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law purport to 
transfer 17 acres to Plaintiff under the release provision, thus not 
offsetting the Lear Contract against property to be conveyed as set 
forth in the Court's Rulings (R. 228-230) 
25. Appellees have tendered their transfer of the seventeen 
acres, but only by quit claim deed. (R. 248-253) 
26. No Findings were made with respect to apportionment of the 
water stock. (R. 546-553) 
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27. Thereafter in May 1991, Appellant through Neal Gunnarson 
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. This Motion was amended by present counsel and the matter was 
argued April 10, 1992. 
Cj_ DisHOSition^^n^Court^Below 
A two day Court trial was held October 12 & 19, 1989 before the 
Honorable Scott Daniels. R. 412-545. At the Conclusion thereof the 
Court made its ruling (as set out indetail in the facts section) R. 
546-553. 
Thereafter, and without completing the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment, Appellant's counsel withdrew. (R. 200). Appellees1 counsel 
submitted proposed Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment which was 
signed by the Court on Februray 8, 1990. (R. 222-247). The 
Certificate of Mailing on the proposed Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment is unsigned and recties the wrong address for Tage Nyman 
(President of Garrard). (R. 235, 247). 
On May 16, 1990, a Motion to Set Aside The Findings and 
Conclusions is filed by E. Neal, Gunnarson on behalf of Garrard. On 
December 23, 1991, an Amended Motion to Set Aside Findings and 
Conclusions is filed by Garrard's present counsel. (R. 326-328) The 
Motion, after briefing, is heard by the Court on April 10, 1992, 
wherein the Court denied the Motion stating: 
But I think the bottom line on this case is 
the fact that the issue is whether this is a 
clerical error and comes under Rule 60 (a) 
or not. And I just don't think it is. 
Clerical error is you can say "Plaintiff" 
instead of "Defendant" or you have a wrong 
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number Ii i there because of a typo or 
something like that. If it's even what you 
say it is, that it is intentional over-
reaching, even if it's that, that's not a 
clerical error. : don't think clerical 
error occurs when there's a legitmate or 
even a fanciful dispute as to what the Court 
ordered and, therefore, question as to how 
the Findings should be drafted. That is a 
matter that needs to be handled by objection 
to the Findings,, or at the very best, a 
Motion to alter or amend them, or even at 
the very best, a Motion to have them changed 
for reasons of excusable neglect. And that 
has to be within a reasonable time, not a 
couple of years later. I just think under 
the circumstances it's too 1 ate. 1 thi nk 
that it needed to be done right after, two 
and a half years ago, and it wasn't. And I 
really don't think you have the power to 
modify them or set them aside at this point 
and, therefore, they will stand and the 
Motion will be denied. (R. 5^4-575) 
"T" •• «. j 9b. 
Notice or Appeal wa 
At trial, Oaiiard essentially sought recisio^ ••: +-he contract 
-j-n
 : r^^nrn -,- f.he monies z.r* i < for thp Seller's breach, Mousleys 
breach. The c- n> ._,:••• t * . . , , . 'laoiiioneu1 a 
remedy in eau*- r-^ 4 <;n t-i cipated by either Darty, 
: * .1 :i E F i i i ::i:i i lgs -
C o n c l u s i o n s and Judgment d: i m U J U I I L s i M . m y u. the documents 
submi ^ ^ d *• ^ i p ] p " f ^ P ^ ^ " ^ C r i c - i n - a l -»r m r -is a matter of J aw. 
i:ii I ::: 1 .• = :i t l : :i = c .] i :ie 
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was not offset against land conveyed to Garrard as the Court 
instructed, a money Judgment was granted Mousleys for the Lear 
contract, contrary to the Court's instruction, and the land tendered 
to Garrard was by quit claim deed rather than pursuant to the 
contract (Special Warranty Deed) as instructed by the Court. 
Mousleys argue that the time to set aside a Judgment under Rule 
59 has passed, that this is not a clerical error and that no 
objection to the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Judgment was 
timely filed. Mousleys have not addressed the failure to send notice 
to Nyman's correct address or the fact that the certificate of 
mailing is unsigned in the record. 
VI^ ARGUMENT_AND_AUTHORITIES 
1. WHERE THE TRIAL COURT RULES THAT A PARTY'S COUNSEL PREPARE 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONSISTENT WITH THE 
COURT'S RULINGS AND SAID COUNSEL WITHDRAWS, THE COURT SHOULD SET 
ASIDE THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY OPPOSING 
COUNSEL UNDER RULE 60(a) WHEN SAID FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
JUDGMENT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RULINGS. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(a) provides: 
Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in 
Judgment, Orders, or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the Court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the Motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
Court orders... 
Page *.„, 
x estcir -5 : r.hor* - --: - • * vacate , set aside, c* 
IDOC, . . ;« jrJers or juagmeri'^ - -
whi/ J not accurately reflect the result or its Judgment. Meagher 
Xi_i:-r^-i_°il -QoniEan. J: •• — > • " ° ^ " ^ <iQ^-« When a 
Judge s i g n s an Order p r e p a r e i.2 ^ o u n s e l , . . . i ^ , : . . i I ». I I 
assuming t h a t : o r r e c t l y r e f l e c t s t he Court":- j udgment , t he m i s t a k e 
ne Cou: +- iT:ay c o r r e c t 
L t e <:l ] Jf* ££iI19Jr2EL.Y^_^a d e > 'l| ' " '" """ 
C i e i l U d i
 e I l o r 
does ,.u. depend upon *.* iuau^ RaUn. ; , ...punas on whether it 
w.3. - av •• rendpr;\.; t r. Judgmen1 . • ecordmq the Judgment as 
Siddowa\ , - -J • i .• LuaeaLuii contemplated i: _ ru.° 
I---* t r'.K*-i ' < >•> ;\.* i - : ref lectma * r>:- actual 
• tar. LW** lii« prebent cust , there are three Oit,unct 
clerical errors in ILL Lunclusuns ci Law, bindings of Fact and 
First, ''-^  Court ordered that counsel "value" the Tear CcntrarV 
The*-' wa : -th-i . ppellees1 " .i-rn-f . merely took 
i" 
-i . -it*
 :earsr together wn.\ interest, ana entered a money Judgment 
tor *r i + -T^"- o^> palatable that a con^ra^t assigned for 
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payments already made for the many years prior to the date of its 
assignment. It is not reasonable that one would assume this. There 
was no honest attempt at valuation done. 
Second, and even more egregious, the amount was made into a 
money Judgment rather than offset against the land awarded Garrard as 
the Court expressly instructed. There cannot be any argument that 
the Court intended a money Judgment with regard to the Lear Contract 
security. The Court specifically stated not once, but twice, to 
offset the amount of the Lear Contract as "valued" against the amount 
of land to be conveyed under the release provisions to Appellant. In 
short, when the Court ordered that the land to be conveyed be offset 
against the money Garrard owed for failure to deliver the Lear 
Contract proceeds, Mousleys1 counsel submitted proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which awarded a money Judgment instead. 
This clearly falls within the parameters of a clerical error since 
the Judgment is not as the Court rendered it. 
Finally, the Court ordered that the releases were to be conveyed 
"pursuant to the Contract." Nowhere in the contract does it ever 
talk about quit claim deeds. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment make the award to be by quit claim deed. The 
contract consistently refers only to special warranty deeds. 
Accordingly, the very conveyance which the Court ordered the 
Appellees to make, were thwarted and the conveyance is only a mere 
quit claim deed, not a marketable deed, and not the special warranty 
deed bargained for by the parties, or as instructed by the Court. 
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There is manifest injustice - 1 lowing a -arty ti; modify express aiid 
preparer wii ,1^1 — * . ..JU-IJ... 
iuthoritv * xewritr t - Judge's express rulinc. 'iat .5 *i:*jt 
la Ken *.: wnwj.tr # 1 *v absence of a val .-Lior. , uhe granting • :)f := 
money Judgmerr .nsteaa of offsetting the ir.*- ev aqa n.s: :u:vj conveyed, 
Q e e Q j iD 1 . ' • I I , ^^  tr i . * 1 w i. i 1 M o ^ -» i * a v. . ^ v u u x u j i v j ' i i , - . J- ..-i» 1 
Judgment do n ' a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t t h e \ u * ' a r u l i n g s . Trie C o u r t 
f a n c i f u l argument c o u i u b t m a d t , u i f . 1. i t u ^ a i e i r ^ i w ^ ^ ;i
 f i c o t i . i . , 
A p p e l l a ^ * * e s p o n d s as f o l l o w s : 
-d 
thero LM- J money Judgment :,,: LIHJ Ltai u. -act, and 
Second, t-* > • • ' - *> tandarri of 1 ,-* he aoplied. The cases 
below clearly established wnat tne stanaai : ot a clerical error . :-
,;r^ : - - •<=> Co-- •• r- . . . , ,1M.,|V —,-,-t- standard >"•-* 
f 
Par* an.i *.'onc J usions o: uaw , ana Judgment* nuuiu L>te reversed. 
I:!. WHERE THE JUDGE FINDS BOTH THE BUYER AND SELLER UNDER AN 
1 NiiTALLMUNT I \l\ I. ESTATK m r IT'R/"11 C T , kill I1 <""11! I I" K " 1,1II »K; 1 W VTKF I S T O C K , ARM I N 
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BREACH, AND ORDERS A PARTIAL CONVEYANCE TO BUYER AND A PARTIAL 
FORECLOSURE BY SELLER, THE COURT IS REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
APPORTION THE WATER STOCK. 
Utah Code ss 78-37-6 provides as follows: 
Right of redemption - Sales by Parcels- Of land 
and water stock. Sales of real estate under 
judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens 
are subject to redemption as in case of sales 
under executions generally. Ill_all_cases_where 
th^iudgment^direct^ 
wi.th_sha£es_of_co££ora^ 
t2_§_wate£_r i2.^ t-M§£^ «2£-ill£§D.^ §^ --i2--^ £-.H§£^ jL-2I 
£yi^§ble_for_usex_on_the_l 
£3Hit§^IZ_§EP2£ti2Il«§ii2^-^§^§£-.§t22]i_£2_i:^£--i§Il^x 
2£-§251§-E§£t-_tll§£§2l.x-ill--2Il§--2t^ n!2£§«E§£2§.I§jL_§§ 
l§n^_§Q^_w§ter_stock_iji^ 
t22§ther^_and_for_the_£urgose^ 
redem£tion__as_aboye_speci.f ^ ed. In all sales of 
real estate under foreclosure the Court may 
determine the parcels and the order in which such 
parcels of property shall be sold, [emphasis 
supplied] 
There are no cases construing the statute cited above. However, 
it is clear that the legislature has made this statute mandatory. It 
is equally apparent, that there is a policy underlying this statute, 
a land management policy, which has roots of more significant concern 
than that of the dispute between the parties before the Court. Our 
legislature is against making irrigated land into arid land. This is 
a generational concern. This land which will pass from generation to 
generation, and has greater impact on the well-being and welfare of 
the State than do the equities of the particular parties tending to 
own it at the moment. Where the Court, as in this instance, took it 
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upon itself t* •• fashion a remeay in equity, JI:"1 a remedy not asked for 
mnium it ha- •achin-. -h,t remedv _. 
accordaii^t: WJ . i.<* ^ mandate o. . ._:. 
Tnu - •-: * snoul" ricvf apportioned the water stock. 
j r t Q£ t h e judgment, 
since uu l 1nu, «: * • . • ...**, .* ^  . _ ^ „ - , - . ^  require a Mot ion 
under Rule *• . However, ever i *: * \" :. red, Wh^te^v^ 
^ w ^ it a L i " *• - '*** 
Court has L:<- ^uwei v -J.I^V^ MULLJL^^ ui Judgment, even . . „ : a 
Judgment iQ * <~ -' pursuant to 
1
 - r - - tne mandate 
f ' \ ~< .T"^ , „ ,* i eate) Luiiuc. Luui. L 11 c liiierests 
Appellees *~ * ' " ^* /^ror stocK --.-..oi * : onment would 
to -i^portjon, tne Appellant ._M u -K>L uvt-.i i* ,«jjvt tne same type * : 
land * * * 3rnainea. accordingly, tne decision ^i tne xower 
.. . 3. 
UNDER A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, WHERE BUYER 
PLEDGES SECURITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE 01- FU~ : LDING OF A BRIDGE, THE 
: - - . .: - -. :: ii: THE SECURITY I s i 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES, b. i WITHOUT DEDUCTING SELLER'S CONCURRENT SAVINGS 
FOR NOT HAVING ""• P I U , n T4E BRIDGE. 
There is , 
tne vntract .-nly provided tnat SeiLer's interest :,e security was 
se of ster-r:"" "^ ana building said bridge. AH une 
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present case, the Court did not order the bridge to be built, and 
could not have inasmuch as the county land use restrictions were the 
reason that the Buyer, Garrard, could not build the subject bridge. 
To award the value of the security, in lieu of the bridge, is 
manifest injustice. The Sellers have saved the cost of the bridge 
and therefore have no need to take security. A fact finder should 
not be permitted to arbitrarily ignore competent, credible and 
uncontradicted evidence; nevertheless, he is not bound to slavishly 
follow the evidence in figures given by any particular witness and, 
w i t h i. n_ 1 im i t s_o f _r e a son, is it his prerogative to place his own 
appraisal upon the evidence which impresses him as credible and draw 
conclusions therefrom in accordance with his own best Judgment. Even 
Odd sx_I nc ^ y ^ N i e 1 son , 22 Ut. 2d, 49, 448 P.2d 709 (Utah 1968). The 
desired objective, in computing damages, is to evaluate any loss 
suffered by the most direct, practical and accurate method that can 
be employed, id. In the present case, the damages awarded the 
Sellers, Mousleys, do not put Mousleys in as good a position as they 
would have been in had there not been a breach. It puts the Sellers 
in a better position. They get not only their security, but are 
relieved of their obligation to build a bridge concurrent therewith. 
They've doubled their money. Such manifest injustice cannot go 
undaunted. 
While the Court may not have been able to review this question 
had the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law not contained the 
clerical errors discussed in Part 1 of this brief, inasmuch as the 
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Findings of Fact a:\d Conclusions of Law must be set aside due to M,e 
( o —jears univ --.,>-^  . - thro*- tti° r nurt Fhr^ 
revuw A^iv„ «^,... . , damages as ir.uco. . 
a question o: ;ue i - interpretation of - - -violence
 f this a question of 
ine evidence b ~ " " *-^ ° "ria± 
Coui iamages imposed ana . _ 
properly be eversed. 
VII^ CONCLUSIONS 
For th«_- foregoina reason:;, the Motio • > -• * -\sic- Findings 
1 
the trial Cuoi- ':, uenidi inereuL snuuiJ i> leversed. ^u lemand, the 
trial Court shouLd b*- • nr;-d rno r-d to reevaluate the damages arising 
f-
compensated iu: a uiiage uiey themselves * i i i nevei nave i • i-^.ld. 
Before addressing the J^FOI^ of valinna t-r- I.ear Contract, the Coui _ 
s* * 
bridge navin '•*'*" nu i 11 , iess tne savings they nave benented bo 
not ha v inn r "I.; • - *• >,. i IHOP thpmselve: ' * *  ^  p v e o tt-ere is 
S O i l H 1 (' 
C o n t r a c t ' s V U I J L (. V-U.* . . ,u- ..t : s . n.* amuu, ? ; i damage , i f a n y , 
s h o i - d :**• • r> o f f s e t a g a i n s t t h e lane- n • weyer i t o t h p A p p e l l a n t - - n ^ 
apL. 
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of land from the Sellers to the Buyer, should be by special warranty 
deed and not by quit claim deed in accordance with the original 
ruling by the Court. 
DATED this 16th day of November, ,1992. 
Steven A. 'Withrich 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Garrard Garage 
I mailed 4 copies of the foregoing on November 16, 1992 to the 
following: 
Mitchell J. Olsen No. #3845 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone 2 55-7176 
